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Client-Specific Litigation Risk and Audit Quality Differentiation 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose – The purpose of this study is to examine whether client-specific litigation risk 
affects the audit quality differentiation between Big N and non-Big N auditors.  
Specifically, we examine whether higher quality audits of Big N auditors relative to non-
Big auditors is more pronounced for clients with high litigation risk than for clients with 
low litigation risk.   
Design/methodology/approach – We develop the hypothesis based on auditors’ 
potential monetary and reputational losses, collect the data of U.S. listed companies from 
the Compustat and CRSP databases, and conduct regression analyses.  
Findings – We find that the higher effectiveness of Big N auditors over non-Big N 
auditors in constraining earning management is greater for high litigation risk clients than 
for low litigation risk clients, suggesting that clients’ high litigation risk can force big 
auditors to perform more effectively. 
Originality/value – This study contributes to the literature by providing novel evidence 
on the effect of client-specific litigation risk on the audit quality differentiation between 
Big N and non-Big N auditors.  Our findings complement the extant research on the 
relationship between the audit quality differentiation and country-level litigation risk. 
Keywords  Litigation risk, Audit quality, Big auditors, Earnings management 
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1.        Introduction 
           Extant studies (e.g., Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999; Krishnan, 2003; 
Behn et al., 2008) find that Big N auditors have higher audit quality than non-Big N 
auditors.  There are two explanations for the higher audit quality of big auditors.  
DeAngelo (1981) explains that big auditors are more concerned with their brand name 
reputation protection, which motivates them to better perform their work.  Alternatively, 
Dye (1993) indicates that big auditors work better in order to protect their large wealth 
(i.e., ‘deep pockets’) from the lawsuits against them.  Recently, Khurana and Raman 
(2004) and Francis and Wang (2008) suggest that the audit quality differentiation 
between Big N and non-Big N auditors is positively affected by country-level litigation 
risk, which is consistent with the ‘deep pockets’ explanation.   However, Choi et al. 
(2008) find that Big 4 fee premiums are lower in strong legal liability regimes than in 
weak legal liability regimes, inconsistent with the ‘deep pockets’ theory.  To complement 
these studies, our study focuses on client-specific litigation risk. 
           There is rare research into the effect of client-specific litigation risk on the audit 
quality differentiation between Big N and non-Big N auditors.  It is warranted to 
document such evidence because client-specific litigation risk more explicitly affects an 
auditor’s legal liability for auditing a specific client than country-level litigation risk 
does.  To fill in this research gap, our study examines whether client-specific litigation 
risk affects the higher audit quality of Big N auditors relative to non-Big N auditors.  The 
‘deep pockets’ theory shows that perceived audit quality is linked to auditors’ wealth.  
Since big auditors have more wealth at risk, they have greater incentives, especially when 
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clients have high litigation risk, to effectively audit financial statements and monitor 
financial reporting system in order to avoid or reduce monetary losses.  Moreover, big 
auditors may also care about reputational losses caused by litigation.  Thus, we 
conjecture that big auditors provide higher quality audits to high litigation risk clients 
than to low litigation risk clients.  
           Using a large sample of 81,901 client-year observations for 1988-2006 in U.S., we 
find that the level of discretionary accruals of Big N auditors’ clients is more likely to be 
lower than that of non-Big N auditors’ clients when clients have high litigation risk.  
Further analyses indicate that Big N auditors more effectively constrain earnings 
management than non-Big auditors for high litigation risk clients but not for low 
litigation risk clients.  We find similar results when we estimate the regression by 
clustering clients to control for the autocorrelation of time-series data.   
           In other additional analyses, we address a concern on auditors’ self-selection bias.  
We use the self-selection model to deal with this issue.  We find that the results still hold 
after correcting for the potential self-selection bias.  We also test our hypothesis by using 
the frequency of small earnings increase, discretionary accruals based on the Jones model 
without the intercept term, and discretionary accruals based on the modified Jones model 
as alternative measures of earnings management, and find similar results.  We examine 
whether client-specific litigation risk affects the higher audit quality of industry specialist 
auditors relative to non-specialist auditors.  We also document that the audit quality 
differentiation between industry specialist auditors and non-specialist auditors is more 
pronounced for high litigation risk clients than for low litigation risk clients, suggesting 
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that client-specific litigation risk positively affects the audit quality of industry specialist 
auditors. As the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 may increase 
auditors’ legal liability, we also examine whether the effect of client-specific litigation 
risk on the audit quality differentiation is stronger in the post-SOX period than in the pre-
SOX period.  We do not find significant evidence that big auditors have been more 
concerned with client-specific litigation risk after the SOX became effective.  
           A major contribution of this study to the literature is to provide more explicit 
evidence on the relationship between litigation risk and the audit quality differentiation 
between Big N and non-Big N auditors.  Although Khurana and Raman (2004) and 
Francis and Wang (2008) document evidence on the positive impact of litigation risk on 
the audit quality differentiation, they focus on country-level litigation exposure.  
Moreover, Choi et al. (2008) suggest that Big 4 auditors are not more concerned with 
country-level legal liability, inconsistent with the findings of and Raman (2004) and 
Francis and Wang (2008).  Thus, it is warranted to conduct further tests to clarify this 
issue.  Unlike these studies, our study tests this issue at the client level of litigation risk.  
We are interested in client-specific litigation risk because it more explicitly affects an 
auditor’s legal liability for auditing a specific client than country-level litigation risk 
does.  Our findings can complement the extant research that focuses on country-level 
litigation risk.  
           The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the related 
studies and develops the hypothesis.  Section 3 discusses the research design.  Section 4 
presents the empirical results.  We conclude in Section 5. 
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2.       Related studies and hypothesis 
2.1     Big auditors and audit quality 
           There is a stream of research on the relationship between auditor size and audit 
quality.  DeAngelo (1981) argues that auditor size is positively related to audit quality 
because big auditors have greater incentives to protect their reputations by providing high 
quality audit services to clients.  Francis (1984), Palmrose (1986), and Craswell et al. 
(1995) find that audit prices are positively associated with auditor size.  Palmrose (1988) 
finds that non-Big 8 auditors have higher litigation occurrence than Big 8 auditors.  These 
studies suggest that big auditors may have higher audit quality.  Beatty (1989) documents 
an inverse relation between IPO firms’ auditor size and initial returns earned by investors, 
and argues that Big 8 auditors have higher reputations than non-Big 8 auditors.  
           Teoh and Wong (1993) find that earnings response coefficient is higher for Big 8 
auditors’ clients than for non-Big 8 auditors’ clients, suggesting that big auditors’ high 
audit quality or reputations can increase investors’ response to earnings surprises.  
Davidson and Neu (1993) find that management earnings forecasts are more accurate 
when clients are audited by large accounting firms.  Schwartz and Soo (1996) document 
that the time to file the Form 8-K and the frequency of late filings increase significantly 
when clients are audited by non-Big 6 auditors, which supports the argument on the 
higher audit quality of big auditors.  Becker et al. (1998) examine the effect of audit 
quality on earnings management.  They document that clients of non-Big 6 auditors 
report more income-increasing discretionary accruals than clients of Big 6 auditors.  
Their findings indicate that big auditors are more effective in constraining earnings 
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management than non-big auditors.  Francis et al. (1999) also examine the association 
between auditor size and discretionary accruals.  They find that Big 6 auditor clients have 
lower levels of discretionary accruals even though they have higher levels of total 
accruals.  
           Krishnan (2003) examines the effect of audit quality on the informativeness of 
discretionary accruals.  He finds that stock returns and future profitability are more 
positively associated with discretionary accruals for firms audited by Big 6 auditors than 
for firms audited by non-Big 6 auditors, suggesting that discretionary accruals of Big 6 
auditor clients are less opportunistic and more efficient.  Behn et al. (2008) investigate 
whether audit quality affects the predictability of accounting earnings.  They find that 
analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy is higher and the forecast dispersion is lower for 
firms audited by Big 5 auditors.  Thus, the higher audit quality of big auditors can 
increase analysts’ forecasting performance.  Chang et al. (2009) examine the effect of 
auditor quality on companies’ financing decisions.  Their analytical analyses show that 
higher audit quality reduces the impact of market conditions on financial decisions.  
Consistent with the theoretical predictions, they document evidence that clients of Big 6 
auditors are more likely to issue equity as opposed to debt than clients of non-Big 6 
auditors.  They also find that clients of Big 6 auditors make larger equity issues than 
clients of non-Big 6 auditors.  In summary, many extant studies suggest that Big N 
auditors provide higher quality audit than non-Big N auditors.  
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2.2     Auditor litigation 
           Auditor litigation risk has been an ongoing concern to auditors for many years.  
Auditor litigation costs are increasingly higher in the U.S.  For example, Free (1999) 
indicates that litigation costs in the U.S. were 14% of gross audit fees in 1992.  Pratt and 
Stice (1994) report that the cost level of auditor litigation has been increased 300% from 
1985 to 1994.  Recently, the potential liability of auditors has been highlighted by the 
demise of Arthur Andersen.  Thus, it is important for auditors to mitigate the possibility 
of lawsuits against them.  
           Prior research on auditor litigation focuses on identifying the factors that may 
affect the likelihood of auditor litigation.  St. Pierre and Anderson (1984) analyze 129 
cases that were filed against auditors.  Their results indicate that the legal risk for auditors 
increases when they are dealing with new clients, but not increases when they rigidly 
adopt conservatism that leads to errors in undervaluing assets, recognizing inadequate 
amounts of revenue, or recognizing excessive expenses.  Stice (1991) examines the 
association between pre-audit engagement characteristics of the client and the subsequent 
filing of a lawsuit against the auditor.  He finds that the ratios of accounts receivable and 
inventory to total assets, variance of abnormal returns, financial condition, and market 
value are significantly associated with auditor litigation.  Carcello and Palmrose (1994) 
investigate the effect of modified audit reports issued prior to bankruptcy on auditors’ 
legal liability including both lawsuits claiming audit failure and payments made to 
resolve the lawsuits.  Their findings suggest that issuing modified audit reports can 
reduce auditor litigation when clients declared bankruptcy.  
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            Lys and Watts (1994) test the predictions based on the variables derived from a 
qualitative analysis of both the legal conditions and the economic incentives to bring a 
lawsuit.  They find that lawsuits against auditors are more likely to occur for clients with 
larger size, income-increasing accruals, financial difficulties, poor stock price 
performance, or qualified audit reports.  They also find a higher likelihood of lawsuit if 
the auditor employs an unstructured audit technology and if the client represents a 
relatively large proportion of the auditor’s revenues.  Shu (2000) comprehensively 
examines the determinants of auditor litigation risk by incorporating previous studies’ 
findings in developing her model.  She documents that auditor litigation is positively 
related to client size, the ratios of accounts receivable and inventory to total assets, return 
on assets, financial leverage, sales growth, beta, stock turnover, delisting, high-tech 
industry, and qualified opinion, and is negatively related to stock returns. 
          There is some extant research that examines the relationship between auditor 
litigation risk and audit quality.  Dye (1993) develops an analytical model showing that 
the perceived quality of an audit is linked to the auditor’s wealth.  Based on this “deep 
pocket” theory, big auditors provide higher quality audit because they have more wealth 
at risk in case of litigation.  Lennox (1999) documents evidence that big auditors are 
more likely to be sued and criticized and that criticized auditors do not suffer client 
losses, which supports the litigation explanation for the audit quality differentiation 
between Big N and non-Big N auditors.  Khurana and Raman (2004) examine whether 
the higher audit quality of big auditors is related to country-level litigation risk.  Using ex 
ante cost of equity capital as a proxy for financial reporting credibility, they find that Big 
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4 audits are associated with a lower ex ante cost of equity capital in the U.S. where 
litigation risk is high, but not in Australia, Canada, or the U.K. where litigation risk is 
lower than in the U.S.  Francis and Wang (2008) investigate the association between Big 
4 audits and earnings quality across countries.  They document significant difference in 
earnings quality between clients of Big 4 auditors and clients of non-Big 4 auditors in 
strong legal regimes but not in weak legal regimes.  These results suggest that country-
level litigation exposure affects the audit quality differentiation between Big 4 and non- 
Big 4 auditors.  Choi et al. (2008) examine the difference in Big 4 fee premiums across 
15 countries.  They find that Big 4 fee premiums decrease in the strength of a legal 
regime, inconsistent with Francis and Wang (2008).  In summary, these studies focus on 
country-level litigation risk, and there is rare research into the effect of client-specific 
litigation risk on the higher audit quality of big auditors. 
 
2.3     Hypothesis 
           Prior research (e.g., Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999) finds that Big N 
auditors provide high quality auditors than non-Big N auditors.  This is because Big N 
auditors may have greater incentives to provide high quality audits than non-Big N 
auditors.  One explanation for the audit quality differentiation between Big N and non-
Big N auditors is that Big N auditors may have higher demand for reputation protection 
as they have more valuable reputations (DeAngelo, 1981).  An alternative explanation for 
the audit quality differentiation is that Big N auditors may suffer more losses in case of 
litigation since they have more wealth at risk (Dye, 1993).  Consistent with the litigation 
explanation, Khurana and Raman (2004) and Francis and Wang (2008) provide evidence 
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that Big N auditors provide higher quality audits in high litigious jurisdictions but not in 
low litigious jurisdictions.  
           This study focuses on client-specific litigation risk within the U.S. context which 
has a higher litigation exposure environment.  We examine whether client-specific 
litigation risk is related to the audit quality differences between Big N and non-Big N 
auditors.  Since big auditors have more wealth, they are more likely to be attractive 
targets for lawsuits (Dye, 1993).  Big N auditors will suffer more monetary and 
reputational losses from lawsuits than non-Big N auditors.  Thus, big auditors have 
greater incentives to avoid or mitigate potential litigation.  When clients’ litigation risk is 
high, big auditors are motivated to expend more efforts and execute more expertise and 
specialization in auditing the clients’ financial statements and overseeing their financial 
reporting system.  Hence, we predict that big auditors provide higher quality audits to 
clients with high litigation risk than to clients with low litigation risk.  Our hypothesis is 
formulated as follows: 
           H1.  Audit quality differences between Big N and non-Big N auditors are more  
                 pronounced for clients with high litigation risk than for clients with low  
                 litigation risk. 
 
3.       Research design 
3.1     Data 
           We collect financial statement data from the Compustat database over the period 
1988 to 2006.  Since Hribar and Collins (2002) show that accruals calculated using the 
“balance-sheet approach” are more prone to measurement error and could lead to 
10 
 
incorrect conclusions regarding firms’ earnings management activities, we calculated 
accruals via the statement of cash flows, which became available in 1988.  Thus, our 
sample period begins in 1988.  We also collect stock market data from the CRSP 
database for the sample period.  After excluding observations with missing data for the 
analyses, the final sample consists of 81,901 firm-year observations for 1988 to 2006.  
Table 1 reports the distribution of observations across years.  The highest frequency is 
5,184 firm-year observations for 1997, while the lowest frequency is 3,139 firm-year 
observations for 2006.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
3.2     Discretionary accruals 
           We choose earnings management to reflect audit quality because Heninger (2001) 
finds that higher earnings management leads to more ex post auditor litigation.  
Discretionary accruals are usually used to measure earnings management in the literature 
(e.g., Klein, 2002; Chung and Kallapur, 2003).  Following Kothari et al. (2005), we 
compute performance-matched discretionary accruals because they suggest that 
discretionary accruals adjusted for a performance-matched firm’s discretionary accruals 
are less misspecified than other measures of discretionary accruals.1  First, we estimate 
the following Jones model within each two-digit SIC industry-year: 
           ACC/TA
-1 = a0 1/TA-1 + a1 ∆SALES/TA-1 + a2 PPE/TA-1 + ε                     (1) 
where  
          ACC = total accruals, measured as the difference between earnings before  
                     extraordinary items and discontinued operations and cash flows from  
                     operations, 
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          TA
-1 = total assets at the beginning of the year, 
   ∆SALES = change in sales from the previous year to the current year, 
         PPE = gross property, plant, and equipment. 
           To estimate the parameters in equation (1), we run the no-intercept regression for 
each two-digit SIC industry-year by using all firm-year observations on the Compustat in 
the industry-year.2  After estimating equation (1), we measure discretionary accruals as 
the residual value (i.e., the difference between total accruals and non-discretionary 
accruals) from equation (1) for each sample observation.            
           Second, we identify performance-matched observations by matching each firm-
year observation in the sample to a firm-year observation from the population by the 
same two-digit SIC industry-year and the closest return on assets (ROA) to control for the 
effect of firm performance on the estimate of discretionary accruals (Kothari et al., 2005).  
The performance-matched discretionary accruals for each sample observation are 
computed by subtracting the discretionary accruals of the matched observations from the 
discretionary accruals of the sample observations.  Since managers manipulate earnings 
not only upward but also downward (Levitt, 1998), we use the absolute value of the 
performance-matched discretionary accruals as the measure of earnings management.   
 
3.3     Litigation risk 
           As auditor litigation risk is associated with many factors,3 it is necessary to use a 
comprehensive measure of litigation risk.  Shu (2000) explains auditor litigation using 14 
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firm characteristics.  Based on Shu’s (2000) findings, Krishnan and Zhang (2005) 
develop a summary measure of litigation score: 
LITSCORE = 0.276*SIZE + 1.153*INV + 2.075*REC +1.251*ROA + 1.501*LEV 
                       + 0.301*GROWTH – 0.371*RET + 0.235*BETA +1.464*TURNOVER 
                       + 1.060*DELIST + 0.928*TECH + 0.463*OPINION – 10.049         (2)4          
where  
       LITSCORE = litigation score, 
                 SIZE = natural log of total assets at the end of the year, 
                  INV = inventory divided by lagged total assets at the end of the year, 
                 REC = receivables divided by lagged total assets at the end of the year, 
                ROA = net income in the year deflated by average total assets, 
                 LEV = total liabilities divided by total assets at the end of the year, 
      GROWTH = change in sales from the previous year to the current year divided by  
                        the previous year’s sales, 
 
               RET =  compounded stock returns over the year ending with the last day of  
                           the fiscal year, 
 
             BETA = slope coefficient of a regression of daily stock returns on equally  
                              weighted market returns over the year ending with the last day of the   
                           fiscal year, 
 
    TURNOVER = proportion of shares that were traded at least once during the year  
                           ending with the last day of the fiscal year, computed as  
                           (1- Πt[1 – turnover rate at day t]), 
 
             DELIST = 1 if the company is delisted because of financial difficulties within the  
                           next year, and 0 otherwise, 
 
                TECH = 1 if the company’s SIC code is in the 2830s, 3570s, 7370s, 8730s, and  
                           between 3825 and 3839, and 0 otherwise, 
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        OPINION = 1 if the company received a going concern opinion in the previous  
                           year, and 0 otherwise. 
 
           We use equation (2) to compute litigation score and then categorize each year’s 
sample firms into high litigation risk group and low litigation risk group where high (low) 
litigation risk firms are firms whose litigation scores are (not) greater than the median 
litigation score of the year’s sample firms.   
 
3.3      Model 
           We test the hypothesis based on the following regression model: 
       ADAC = b0 + b1LITRISK + b2BIGAUD + b3LITRISK*BIGAUD + b4 MB + b5ACNI  
                     + b6DEBT + b7ASSETS + b8 LOSS + Year dummies + ε                         (3) 
where  
        ADAC = absolute value of the performance-matched discretionary accruals, 
    LITRISK = litigation risk, coded “1” for high litigation risk firms and “0” for low   
                     litigation risk firms, 
 
   BIGAUD = big auditors, coded “1” for Big 8 auditors (1988-1989), Big 6 auditors  
                      (1989-1998), Big 5 auditors (1998-2002), and Big 4 auditors (2002-2006),   
                    and “0” otherwise, 
 
            MB = market-to-book ratio, measured as the ratio of the market value of the  
                     common equity to the book value of the common equity, 
 
         ACNI = absolute value of changes in net income from the previous year to the  
                     current year deflated by total assets, 
 
        DEBT = ratio of long-term debt to total assets, 
 
     ASSETS = natural log of total assets,  
 
          LOSS = a dummy coded “1” if net income is negative for both the previous year  
                     and the current year, and “0” otherwise.  
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           In equation (3), the coefficient on the interaction term of LITRISK and BIGAUD 
(i.e., b3) reflects the effect of client-specific litigation risk on the audit quality 
differentiation between Big N and non-Big N auditors.  A negative and significant b3 
indicates that the discrepancy in audit quality between big auditors and small auditors is 
more pronounced for clients with high litigation risk than for clients with low litigation 
risk.  Thus, b3 is expected to be negative and significant if the hypothesis is supported.  
Auditors may work harder when clients have high litigation risk.  However, they may not 
be effective in constraining discretionary accruals as they are more likely to fail in 
auditing these clients.  Otherwise, these clients’ litigation risk may not be high for 
auditors.  Thus, we expect that the coefficient on LITRISK could be either negative or 
positive.  We also expect a negative coefficient on BIGAUD as big auditors provide 
higher quality services than small auditors.        
           We include several other variables in the model to control for the possible effect of 
these firm characteristics on earnings management.5   Since Skinner and Sloan (2002) 
suggest that earnings management is higher for firms with high growth opportunities 
(measured by market-to-book ratio) than for firms with low growth opportunities, we 
expect a positive coefficient on MB.  Dechow et al. (1996) and Klein (2002) find that the 
absolute value of change in net income is positively related to the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals.  Thus, the coefficient on ACNI is expected to be positive.  Klein 
(2002) suggests that firms with high financial leverage may have higher discretionary 
accruals.  However, Jensen and Mecking (1976) argue that financial leverage can reduce 
agency costs.  Therefore, the coefficient on DEBT could be either positive or negative.  
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We expect a negative coefficient on ASSETS because large firms may have higher 
earnings quality (Armstrong et al., 2010).  As earnings quality is lower when firms incur 
losses (Francis et al., 2004), the coefficient on LOSS is expected to be positive.  In 
addition, we also include year dummies in the model to control for fixed year effects.  
 
4.       Empirical results 
           Table 2 provides descriptive statistics.  The mean and median of the absolute value 
of the performance-matched discretionary accruals are 0.116 and 0.074, respectively.  
Eighty-six percent of the sample firms were audited by Big N auditors.  Table 3 presents 
the Pearson correlations between independent variables.  The highest correlation 
coefficient is 0.46 between LITRISK and ASSETS.  To examine whether multicollinearity 
is a concern in this study, we compute the regression model’s variance inflation factor 
(VIF) scores.  We find that all VIF scores are less than 10.  Thus, multicollinearity is not 
a substantive issue. 
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here 
          We report the results of the main test in Table 4.  The coefficient on 
LITRISK*BIGAUD is negative and significant (t-statistic = -2.79, p-value <0.01), which 
supports our hypothesis.  The results show that the effectiveness of big auditors in 
constraining earnings management is higher for clients with high litigation risk than for 
clients with low litigation risk.  Our findings indicate that the audit quality differentiation 
is positively related to client-specific litigation risk, consistent with the ‘deep pockets’ 
theory.  The results at the client level of litigation risk are also consistent with the 
Khurana and Raman’s (2004) and Francis and Wang’s (2008) findings that the higher 
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audit quality of Big 4 auditors is positively related to country-level litigation exposure.  
Moreover, the coefficient on BIGAUD is insignificant.  Since the coefficient on BIGAUD 
reflects the effectiveness of big auditors of low litigation risk clients in constraining 
earnings management, the results indicate that there is no significant difference in audit 
quality between Big N and non-Big N auditors when clients have low litigation risk.  
Taken together, our findings are consistent with the Khurana and Raman’s (2004) 
argument that the higher audit quality of big auditors is driven by litigation risk rather 
than brand name reputation protection.  In addition, we find that earnings management is 
positively associated with litigation risk.  This suggests that the effect of high litigation 
risk clients’ incentive to manage earnings may dominate over the effect of their auditors’ 
incentive to constrain earnings management. We also find that the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals is higher for firms with high MB, ACNI, or LOSS, and is lower for 
firms with high DEBT or ASSETS. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
           We conduct several additional analyses to test the robustness of our main results.  
First, we examine the effectiveness of big auditors in constraining earnings management 
for high litigation risk firms and low litigation risk firms separately by running the 
following regression: 
       ADAC = b0 + b1BIGAUD + b2 MB + b3ACNI + b4DEBT + b5ASSETS + b6 LOSS  
                       + Year dummies + ε                                                                   (4) 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 include the results for high litigation risk firms, and Columns 
5 and 6 of Table 5 include the results for low litigation risk firms.  We find that the 
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coefficient on BIGAUD is negative and significant for high litigation risk clients (t-
statistic = -3.39, p-value < 0.01), but is insignificant for low litigation risk clients.  These 
results suggest that compared to non-Big N auditors, Big N auditors provide higher 
quality audits to high litigation risk clients, but not when they have low litigation risk 
clients, which corroborates our main results.   
Insert Table 5 about here 
          Second, we examine whether the results hold after controlling for the 
autocorrelation of time-series data.  We estimate equation (3) by clustering firms.  Table 
6 presents the results of the regression based on clustered standard errors.  We also 
document that the coefficient on LITRISK*BIGAUD is negative and significant (t-statistic 
= -2.22, p-value < 0.05), while the coefficient on BIGAUD is insignificant.  Thus, the 
results are not driven by the time series correlation. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
           Third, we examine whether the results hold after controlling for auditors’ self-
selection bias.  Similar to Khurana and Raman (2004), we first estimate the following 
auditor selection model:6 
       BIGAUD = c0 + c1SHORT + c2LONG + c3PE+ c4ISSUE + c5DEBT + c6ASSETS  
                         + c7LOSS + Year dummies + ε                                                    (5) 
where 
        SHORT = absolute value of short-term accruals in income deflated by sales, 
          LONG = absolute value of long-term accruals in income deflated by sales, 
              P/E = ratio of price to earnings per share, 
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           ISSUE = new equity issue, coded “1” if change in equity is greater than 10% and  
                       “0” otherwise. 
           We run logistic regression to estimate equation (5) and then use the fitted values 
from the logistic regression to compute the inverse Mills ratio (Heckman, 1979).7  Next, 
the inverse Mills ratio (λ) is included in equation (3) to correct for potential self-selection 
bias.  Table 7 provides the results after allowing for auditors’ self-selection bias.  The 
results show that the higher audit quality of big auditors is positively associated with 
litigation risk (t-statistic = -3.45, p-value < 0.01), which also supports our hypothesis.  
Insert Table 7 about here 
           Fourth, we examine whether the results are driven by the potential noise of using 
the Shu’s (2000) litigation score in our long sample period.  To deal with this concern, we 
test the hypothesis using data over the period 1988 to 1996, which is almost 
contemporaneous to the period 1987 to 1996 used in Shu (2000).  We still find that the 
coefficient on LITRISK*BIGAUD is negative and significant (t-statistic = -1.96, p-value < 
0.05).  Thus, the results are less likely to be driven by the long sample period. 
          Fifth, we test the robustness of the results to several alternative measures of 
earnings management.  Following Ashbaugh et al. (2003), we measure earnings 
management using an earnings benchmark dummy, which is coded “1” if the change in 
earnings scaled by the beginning total assets lies in the interval of [0, 0.01) and “0” 
otherwise.8  We then run logistic regression to estimate equation (3) in which ADAC is 
replaced with the earnings benchmark dummy.  We find that the coefficient on 
BIGAUD*LITRISK is negative and significant (non-tabulated chi-square = 3.01, p-value 
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<0.05).  When we include a constant term in the Jones model or use the modified Jones 
model, respectively, to measure discretionary accruals, we also find a negative and 
significant coefficient on BIGAUD*LITRISK (non-tabulated t-statistic = -2.68, p-value < 
0.01; t-statistic = -3.15, p-value < 0.01).  Thus, the results still hold when we measure 
earnings management in alternative ways.   
           Sixth, we examine whether the higher audit quality of industry specialist auditors 
(relative to non-specialist auditors) is positively related to client-specific litigation risk.  
We measure auditor industry specialization as the ratio of the sum of the sales of the 
clients of an auditor in a two-digit SIC industry to the total sum of the sales of all 
companies in that industry (Dunn and Mayhew, 2004).  We estimate equation (3) by 
using auditor industry specialization instead of BIGAUD.  The coefficient on the 
interaction of auditor industry specialization and LITRISK is negative and marginally 
significant (non-tabulated t-statistic = -1.44, p-value < 0.10).  This suggests that the 
difference in audit quality between industry specialist auditors and non-specialist auditors 
is more pronounced for high litigation risk clients than for low litigation risk clients.  
          Finally, we examine whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) affects the 
relationship between client-specific litigation risk and the audit quality differentiation.   
We are interested in this question because the enactment of the SOX may increase 
auditors’ legal liability.  For example, Section 802 of the Act imposes increased criminal 
penalties for auditors involved in accounting fraud.  The Act created the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), which oversees the audits of public companies in 
order to protect the interests of investors.  The passage of the SOX may increase big 
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auditors’ sensitivity to client-specific litigation risk as the SOX imposes new 
responsibilities and lowers the threshold for duty of care.  Thus, we conjecture that the 
effect of litigation risk on the audit quality differences between Big N and non-Big N 
auditors is stronger in the post-SOX period than in the pre-SOX period.  To test this 
conjecture, we run the following regression: 
        ADAC = b0 + b1LITRISK + b2BIGAUD + b3LITRISK*BIGAUD + b4SOX  
                     + b5SOX*LITRISK + b6SOX*BIGAUD + b7SOX*LITRISK*BIGAUD  
                     + b8MB + b9ACNI  + b10DEBT + b11ASSETS + b12 LOSS + ε           (6) 
where SOX is a dummy coded “1” for observations in the post-SOX period (2003-2006) 
and “0” for observations in the pre-SOX period (1988-2002).9  In equation (6), the 
coefficient on LITRISK*BIGAUD captures the effect of litigation risk on the audit quality 
differentiation in the pre-SOX period.  The coefficient on SOX*LITRISK*BIGAUD 
captures the difference in the effect of litigation risk on the audit quality differentiation 
between the post-SOX period and the pre-SOX period.  We expect b6 to be negative and 
significant if our conjecture is supported.  We find a negative and significant coefficient 
on LITRISK*BIGAUD (non-tabulated t-statistic = -2.22, p-value < 0.05). We also find 
that the coefficient on SOX*LITRISK*BIGAUD is negative but insignificant (non-
tabulated t-statistic = -1.25).  Thus, there is no significant evidence to support the 
conjecture. 
         
5.        Conclusion 
           There are two arguments on the reasons for the audit quality differentiation 
between Big N and non-Big N auditors.  DeAngelo (1981) explains that big auditors are 
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more motivated to protect their brand name reputations by providing high quality audit 
services.  However, Dye (1993) suggests that big auditors suffer more monetary losses 
from lawsuits against them than small auditors because they have more wealth (i.e., ‘deep 
pockets’), which leads to their higher audit quality.  Khurana and Raman (2004) and 
Francis and Wang (2008) find that the audit quality differentiation between Big N and 
non-Big N auditors is positively associated with country-level litigation risk, however, 
Choi et al. (2008) suggest that Big auditors may not be concerned with country-level 
litigation risk.  This study addresses this issue by focusing on client-specific litigation 
risk.  We examine whether client-specific litigation risk is related to the higher audit 
quality of big auditors.  We find that the audit quality differentiation Big N and non-Big 
N auditors is more evident when client-specific litigation risk is high, consistent with 
Khurana and Raman (2004) and Francis and Wang (2008). 
           This study contributes to the literature by providing more explicit evidence on 
testing the relationship between litigation risk and the audit quality differentiation 
between Big N and non-Big N auditors.  Unlike Khurana and Raman (2004), Francis and 
Wang (2008), and Choi et al. (2008), this study focuses on client-specific litigation risk.  
It is worth clarifying this issue at the client level of litigation risk because client-specific 
litigation risk more explicitly affects an auditor’s legal liability for auditing a specific 
client.  This study complements the extant research that only uses countries’ legal 
environments to measure auditors’ litigation risk. 
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Table 1 
Sample breakdown by year 
      
Year Frequency Percent (%) 
1988 3,617 4.42 
1989 3,795 4.63 
1990 3,810 4.65 
1991 3,798 4.64 
1992 3,978 4.86 
1993 4,249 5.19 
1994 4,648 5.67 
1995 4,834 5.90 
1996 4,982 6.08 
1997 5,184 6.33 
1998 5,103 6.23 
1999 4,863 5.94 
2000 4,661 5.69 
2001 4,641 5.67 
2002 4,369 5.33 
2003 4,222 5.16 
2004 4,022 4.91 
2005 3,986 4.87 
2006 3,139 3.83 
Total 81,901 100.00 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
       
Variable N Mean Median Std Q1  Q3 
ADAC 81,901 0.116 0.074 0.129 0.031 0.151 
LITRISK 81,901 0.500 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 
BIGAUD 81,901 0.860 1.000 0.347 1.000 1.000 
MB 81,901 2.818 1.841 3.954 1.104 3.252 
ACNI 81,901 0.084 0.035 0.134 0.013 0.091 
DEBT 81,901 0.177 0.126 0.187 0.007 0.288 
ASSETS 81,901 5.296 5.124 2.179 3.711 6.742 
LOSS 81,901 0.209 0.000 0.407 0.000 0.000 
 
Notes: 
       ADAC = absolute value of the performance-matched discretionary accruals, 
    LITRISK = litigation risk, coded “1” for high litigation risk firms and “0” for low litigation risk firms, 
   BIGAUD = big auditors, coded “1” for Big 8 auditors (1988-1989), Big 6 auditors (1989-1998), Big 5  
                    auditors (1998-2002), and Big 4 auditors (2002-2006), and “0” otherwise,   
            MB = market-to-book ratio, measured as the ratio of the market value of the common equity to the  
                    book value of the common equity, 
        ACNI = absolute value of changes in net income from the previous year to the current year deflated  
                    by total assets, 
       DEBT = ratio of long-term debt to total assets, 
    ASSETS = natural log of total assets,  
        LOSS = a dummy coded “1” if net income is negative for both the previous year and the current year,  
                     and “0” otherwise.  
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Table 3 
Pearson correlations 
             
Variable BIGAUD MB ACNI DEBT ASSETS LOSS 
LITRISK     0.167***        0.024***  -0.068***        0.170***  0.460*** -0.148*** 
BIGAUD  -0.005 -0.089***    0.071*** 0.312*** -0.086*** 
MB   0.176*** -0.088***    -0.063*** 0.095*** 
ACNI    -0.113***    -0.313*** 0.302*** 
DEBT     0.266*** -0.001 
ASSETS      -0.306*** 
       
Notes: 
      *** denotes the significance at the level of 1% (two-tailed tests). 
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Table 4 
Main regression 
    
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept +/- 0.133 48.03*** 
LITRISK +/- 0.032 13.20*** 
BIGAUD - 0.000 0.06         
LITRISK*BIGAUD - -0.007 -2.79*** 
MB + 0.002 14.49*** 
ACNI + 0.230 67.56*** 
DEBT +/- -0.030 -13.01*** 
ASSETS - -0.010 -38.43*** 
LOSS + 0.032 28.36*** 
    
Year dummies                             Included 
    
N                        81,901 
F-statistic            587.99*** 
Adj. R2                               15.71% 
 
Notes: 
          ADAC = b0 + b1LITRISK + b2BIGAUD + b3LITRISK*BIGAUD + b4 MB + b5ACNI + b6DEBT 
                        + b7ASSETS + b8 LOSS + Year dummies + ε                                                           (3) 
where  
           ADAC = the absolute value of the performance-matched discretionary accruals. 
*** denotes the significance at the level of 1% (one-tailed tests). 
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Table 5 
High or low litigation risk 
    
  
    
      High Litigation Risk           Low Litigation Risk 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept +/- 0.160 39.50***  0.136       35.01*** 
BIGAUD - -0.007   -3.39*** 0.000 0.23 
MB +         0.001     7.12*** 0.002 12.93*** 
ACNI + 0.243     48.15*** 0.219 47.08*** 
DEBT +/- -0.027  -8.91*** -0.033         -9.09*** 
ASSETS - -0.010  -31.03*** -0.010        -22.30*** 
LOSS + 0.024 14.10*** 0.036 23.92*** 
      
Year dummies   Included  Included 
      
N       40,946     40,955 
F-statistic    313.70***   325.78*** 
Adj. R2       15.49%     15.99% 
 
Notes: 
        ADAC = b0 + b1BIGAUD + b2 MB + b3ACNI + b4DEBT + b5ASSETS + b6 LOSS + Year dummies 
                       + ε                                                                                                                           (4)                                                               
*** denotes the significance at the level of 1% (one-tailed tests). 
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Table 6 
Regression by clustering firms 
    
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic
Intercept +/- 0.133 42.96*** 
LITRISK +/- 0.032                             10.33*** 
BIGAUD - 0.000   0.05 
LITRISK*BIGAUD - -0.007   -2.22** 
MB + 0.002                          9.03*** 
ACNI + 0.230                          39.30*** 
DEBT +/- -0.030                           -10.29*** 
ASSETS - -0.010 -31.53*** 
LOSS + 0.032 21.76*** 
    
Year dummies                             Included 
    
N                        81,901 
F-statistic            249.07*** 
R2                               15.73% 
 
Notes: 
*** denotes the significance at the level of 1% (one-tailed tests). 
** denotes the significance at the level of 5% (one-tailed tests). 
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Table 7 
Regression by allowing for auditors’ self-selection bias 
    
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept +/- 0.158 17.09*** 
LITRISK +/- 0.034                         11.51*** 
BIGAUD - -0.048   -2.86*** 
LITRISK*BIGAUD - -0.011 -3.45*** 
MB + 0.002 12.96*** 
ACNI + 0.231 59.83*** 
DEBT +/- -0.037 -11.95*** 
ASSETS - -0.008 -8.84*** 
LOSS + 0.034 25.07*** 
λ +/- 0.018 3.02*** 
    
Year dummies   Included 
    
N    60,817 
F-statistic            428.34*** 
Adj. R2        15.95% 
 
Notes: 
*** denotes the significance at the level of 1% (one-tailed tests). 
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Notes: 
                                                 
1
            We include return on assets in the calculation of litigation score.  As our litigation risk measure is 
correlated with firm performance, it is appropriate to use performance-matched discretionary accruals. 
2
            There are at least eight firms in each two-digit SIC industry-year.  
3
            See Stice (1991), Carcello and Palmrose (1994), Lys and Watts (1994), and Shu (2000). 
4
            Equation (2) and related variable definitions all come from Krishnan and Zhang (2005, pp.122). 
5
            All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%.  
6
            The auditor selection model is discussed in Francis et al. (1999).  
7
            The other variables in equation (6) have been defined in the section of research design.  
8
            Since Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) document unusually low frequencies of small decreases in  
             earnings and unusually high frequencies of small increases in earnings, the frequency of small  
             earnings increase reflects the extent to which managers manipulate reported earnings.  
9
           Since the SOX became in effect on July 30, 2002, we classify the sample period (1988-2006) into 
              the pre-SOX period (1988-2002) and the post-SOX period (2003-2006). 
